John Locke
Second
Treatise on Government
To understand political power aright, and derive it from
its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that
is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing
more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously
born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties,
should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection,
unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of
his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and
convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support
and comfort of their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and
beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the
spontaneous hand of Nature, and nobody has originally a private dominion
exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their
natural state, yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a
means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at
all beneficial, to any particular men. The fruit or venison which nourishes the
wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be
his, and so his- i.e., a part of him, that another can no longer have any right
to it before it can do him any good for the support of his life.
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to
all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person."
This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and
the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever,
then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he
hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state
Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that
excludes the common right of other men. For this "labour" being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others.
MEN being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political
power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other
men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and
peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their
properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any
number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are
left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number of
men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby
presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a
right to act and conclude the rest.
For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body,
with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of
the majority.
For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be
received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual, nothing but the
consent of every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole, which,
considering the infirmities of health and avocations of business, which in a
number though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many
away from the public assembly; and the variety of opinions and contrariety of
interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, it is next
impossible ever to be had.
Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a
community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for
which they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they
expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by
barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact
that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a
commonwealth. And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political
society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority,
to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only,
which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
The great end of men's entering into society being the
enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and
means of that being the laws established in that society, the first and
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the
legislative power, as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern
even the legislative. Itself is the preservation of the society and (as far as
will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is
not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in
the hands where the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody
else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the
force and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative
which the public has chosen and appointed; for without this the law could not
have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the
society, over whom nobody can have a power to make laws* but by their own
consent and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience,
which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately
terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts.
Nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate
power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the
legislative, acting pursuant to their trust, nor oblige him to any obedience
contrary to the laws so enacted or farther than they do allow, it being
ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the
society which is not the supreme.
Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more,
whether it be always in being or only by intervals, though it be the supreme
power in every commonwealth, yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be,
absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but
the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or
assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a
state of Nature before they entered into society, and gave it up to the
community. For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself,
and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to
destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as
has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and
having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or
possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature gave him for the
preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he doth, or can
give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the
legislative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmost bounds of it
is limited to the public good of the society.* It is a power that hath no other
end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave,
or designedly to impoverish the subjects; the obligations of the law of Nature
cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have, by
human laws, known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation. Thus
the law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as
others. The rules that they make for, other men's actions must, as well as their
own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of Nature- i.e., to the
will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of Nature
being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid
against it.
Secondly, the legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws,* and known authorised judges. For the law of Nature being unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men, they who, through passion or interest, shall miscite or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge; and so it serves not as it aught, to determine the rights and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case; and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries or punish
delinquents. To avoid these inconveniencies which disorder men's properties in the state of Nature, men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of Nature. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them; this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition that is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man who has the command of a hundred thousand than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand single men, nobody being secure, that his will who has such a command is better than that of other men, though his force be a hundred thousand times stronger. And, therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of Nature if they shall have armed one or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment, unknown wills, without having any measures set down
which may guide and justify their actions. For all the
power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought
not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established
and promulgated laws, that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and
secure within the limits of the law, and the rulers, too, kept within their due
bounds, and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to employ it to
purposes, and by such measures as they would not have known, and own not
willingly.
Thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from any man any
part of his property without his own consent. For the preservation of property
being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it
necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property, without
which they must be supposed to lose that by entering into society which was the
end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own.
Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such a right to the goods,
which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take
them, or any part of them, from them without their own consent; without this
they have no property at all. For I have truly no property in that which another
can by right take from me when he pleases against my consent. Hence it is a
mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can
do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take
any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where
the legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable,
whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common
laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments where the
legislative is in one lasting assembly, always in being, or in one man as in
absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to
have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, and so will be apt to
increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fit from the
people. For a man's property is not at all secure, though there be good and
equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow-subjects, if
he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man what part
he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.
The reason why men enter into society is the preservation
of their property; and the end while they choose and authorise a legislative is
that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the
properties of all the society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of
every part and member of the society. For since it can never be supposed to be
the will of the society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that
which every one designs to secure by entering into society, and for which the
people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making: whenever the
legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state
of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience,
and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against
force and violence. Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption,
endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute
power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach of
trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite
contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their
original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they
shall think fit), provide for their own safety and security, which is the end
for which they are in society. What I have said here concerning the legislative
in general holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double
trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme
execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own
arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust
when he employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society to corrupt the
representatives and gain them to his purposes, when he openly pre-engages the
electors, and prescribes, to their choice, such whom he has, by solicitation,
threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs, and employs them to bring
in such who have promised beforehand what to vote and what to enact. Thus to
regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is it
but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of
public security? For the people having reserved to themselves the choice of
their representatives as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other
end but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act and
advise as the necessity of the commonwealth and the public good should, upon
examination and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their
votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides,
are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to
set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of
the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of
trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is
possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add rewards and punishments
visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of
to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not
comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past
doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the society who thus
employ it contrary to the trust that along with it in its first institution, is
easy to determine; and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any
such thing as this cannot any longer be trusted.
Here it is like the common question will be made: Who shall
be judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This,
perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the
prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The people shall
be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well and
according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him and must, by
having deputed him, have still a power to discard him when he fails in his
trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it
be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is
concerned and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress
very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
But, farther,
this question, Who shall be judge? cannot mean that there is no judge at all.
For where there is no judicature on earth to decide controversies amongst men,
God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every
man is judge for himself, as in all other cases so in this, whether another hath
put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the
supreme judge, as Jephtha did.
If a
controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people in a matter where the
law is silent or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, I should think
the proper umpire in such a case should be the body of the people. For in such
cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the
common, ordinary rules of the law, there, if any men find themselves aggrieved,
and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to
judge as the body of the people (who at first lodged that trust in him) how far
they meant it should extend? But if the prince, or whoever they be in the
administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies nowhere
but to Heaven. Force between either persons who have no known superior on earth
or, which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war,
wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must
judge for himself when he will think fit to make use of that appeal and put
himself upon it.
To conclude: The
power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it can never
revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always
remain in the community; because without this there can be no community- no
commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement; so also when the
society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them
and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such
successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that
government lasts: because, having provided a legislative with power to continue
for ever, they have given up their political power to the legislative, and
cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the duration of their
legislative, and made this supreme power in any person or assembly only
temporary; or else when, by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is
forfeited; upon the forfeiture of their rulers, or at the determination of the
time set, it reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act as
supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves or place it in a new form,
or new hands, as they think good.
THE END